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Attorneys' Fees
ATTORNEYS' FEES -COMMENT -ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION.
I. INTRODUCTION
Knowledge of the law concerning attorneys' fees is crucial to many
litigators. Since this area of the law is currently in the process of formula-
tion, this comment will survey the recent decisional guidelines concerning
attorneys' fees promulgated by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. The comment will then focus upon the Third Circuit's most
recent pronouncements regarding attorneys' fee awards in connection with
civil rights litigation, the area in which this topic has been most fully de-
veloped.
Under the traditional American rule, courts are not permitted to assess
attorneys' fees against a losing litigant; I each party to the lawsuit bears the
cost of its own counsel. 2 Attorneys' fees are thus not recoverable under this
rule in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing therefor. 3
Objecting to this allegedly inequitable result,4 many commentators have
repeatedly advocated adoption of the English rule,5 which awards fees to the
1. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). The
"American rule" differs from the "English rule," which awards attorneys' fees as a matter of
course to the prevailing party. See generally Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929).
2. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). See also
Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 281
(1977); Hermann & Hoffmann, Financing Public Interest Litigation in State Court: A Proposal
for Legislative Action, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 173, 175 (1978).
3. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). The
United States Supreme Court first announced the rule in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3
Dali.) 306 (1796), and adhered to it in later decisions. See, e.g., Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100
U.S. 483 (1880); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1879); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 211 (1872); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
The practice of only allowing fees in equity or pursuant to statute was derived from Eng-
land. Prior to the American Revolution, English chancery courts allowed, in the discretion of
the Chancellor, the awarding of attorney fees to the prevailing party. D. DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES § 3.8, at 197 (1973), citing Goodhart, supra note 1. While equitable and discretion-
ary considerations governed in the courts of equity, such awards were available in the courts of
law only when authorized by statute. D. DOBBS, supra, § 3.8, at 198. "Thus, there was drawn a
distinction between cases in equity and cases at law with respect to attorney fee awards."
Walker, Recovery of Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Litigation, 39 ALA. LAW. 93, 93 (1978). The
ancient English legal-equitable dichotomy was absorbed into American law without any general
corresponding statute permitting costs at law, and has been the prevailing rule with regard to
the allowance of attorney fees. Id. See generally Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161
(1939).
4. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REV. 75, 84
(1963); Note, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319, 321
(1977). These commentators generally stress the evils of the current rule, including the fact that
under it the successful party is never fully compensated because such party must pay counsel
fees which may be equal to or greater than the total recovery in the suit. Id.
5. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL.
L. REV. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, supra note 4; McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of
(215)
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prevailing party.6  Conversely, those who prefer the American rule gener-
ally maintain that: 1) being forced to pay an opponent's counsel fees is a
form of penalty and that a litigant should not be penalized for defending or
bringing a lawsuit; 7 2) the poor might be reluctant to initiate lawsuits to
vindicate their rights if faced with the prospect of paying their opponent's
counsel fees; 8 and 3) determining the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees
would be too great a burden on the judiciary. 9 Perhaps due to this
rationale, American courts adhere to the American rule 10 and decline to
award attorney fees on a routine basis. There are, however, a number of
statutory and common law exceptions.
II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE AMERICAN RULE
A. Common Law
1. Exceptions
Courts have used their equity powers to fashion three major exceptions
to the American rule: 1) the common fund-substantial benefit exception;
2) the bad faith exception; and 3) the private attorney general exception.1 1
Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619 (1931); McLaughlin, The Recovery
of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 761
(1972); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L.
REV. 202 (1966); Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees and Equal Access to the Court, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 636, 648-55 (1974); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden
Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216 (1967). See generally Note, supra note 4, at 320. See also Posner,
An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES
399, 437-38 (1973).
In spite of this extensive criticism, the American rule has recently been upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
247 (1975).
6. As early as 1278, the courts of England were authorized to award counsel fees to suc-
cessful plaintiffs. See Statute of Glouster, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, c. 1. The Statute of Glouster, which
expressly mentioned only "the costs of his writ purchased," was from the outset liberally con-
strued to encompass all legal costs of suit, including counsel fees. Goodhart, supra note 1, at
852. Since 1606, English courts have been empowered to award counsel fees to defendants in
all actions where such awards might be made to plaintiffs. See Statute of Westminster, 1606, 4
Jac. 1, c. 3. It is now customary in England, after litigation of substantive claims has termi-
nated, to conduct separate hearings before special "taxing masters" in order to determine the
appropriateness and size of counsel fee awards. Goodhart, supra note 1, at 854-55. See generally
C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 60, at 234-36 (1935); Goodhart, supra note 1, at 849-72.
To prevent an undue burden on these masters, fees which may be included in an award are
usually statutorily prescribed in detail-even the amounts that may be recovered for letters
drafted on behalf of a client are set forth. Id. at 856-57.
7. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967);
Sands, Attorney's Fees as Recoverable Costs, 63 A.B.A.J. 510, 513 (1977).
8. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
9. Id.
10. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
11. Walker, supra note 3, at 93-94. The common fund exception first arose in Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882). In Greenough, a bondholder obtained a judgment that pre-
served a fund in which he shared a common interest with other bondholders. Id. at 529. The
bondholders then earned a considerable amount of money from management of the fund by
court appointed agents. Id. The Court, pursuant to its equity power, awarded attorneys' fees
[VOL. 24: p. 215
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The common fund exception applies when a party, at his own expense,
brings an action and creates or preserves a fund in which others share.1 2 If
no fund has been created, the exception may still apply if the litigation has
conferred a substantial benefit on an identifiable class.l 3  Courts, through
their equity power, may award attorneys' fees out of the fund or require
contribution by those on whom the benefit has been conferred. 14 The bad
faith exception allows a court to exercise its equity powers by awarding at-
torneys' fees to a party when his opponent has acted in bad faith, in a vex-
atious or wanton manner, or for oppressive reasons. 15 Finally, the private
attorney general exception, now discredited,' 6 combines the principles of
the common fund and bad faith exceptions by extending the award of attor-
out of the fund in order to avoid undue hardship to the plaintiff and an unfair advantage to the
other bondholders. Id. at 532.
The Supreme Court significantly expanded the common fund exception in Sprague v.
Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). In Sprague, a depositor, by obtaining a judgment
against an insolvent bank, established claims of other depositors against the bank. Id. at 162-63.
The Court approved a fee award to the plaintiff even'though the judgment did not create a fund
for the other depositors. Id. at 167.
Greenough and Sprague established the foundation for a "private attorney general" excep-
tion. Ojeda v. Hackney, 452 F.2d 947, 948 (5th Cir. 1972); Gibbs v. Blackwelder, 346 F.2d 943,
945 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1965). As stated by some commentators, the primary goal underlying com-
mon fund fee awards was "to avoid the unfairness inherent in forcing a plaintiff who bestows
benefits on many to bear alone the expenses of litigation." Hermann & Hoffmann, supra note 2,
at 177, citing Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. at 532. See also Note, Awarding Attorney's Fees
to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public In-
terest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 736, 739-40 (1973).
Opining that the same policy considerations apply where the benefits of litigation are not in
the form of a fund against which fees can be assessed, lower federal courts extended the original
common fund doctrine to such situations. See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 21-22
(N.D. Cal. 1973), opinion supplemented, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464
(9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). These courts took the position that
private attorney generals, if given an incentive to sue, could protect important national interests
not limited to.a clearly definable class. See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d
143, 145 (5th Cir. 1971); LaRaza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd on
other grounds, 440 F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
It should be noted at this point that the lower courts' attempted expansion of the "private
attorney general" doctrine was abrogated by the United States Supreme Court in Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See text accompanying notes 23-25
infra. For example, in both Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1973),
opinion supplemented, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), and LaRaza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D.
Cal. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 440 F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Cal. 1977), the reviewing court
held that the trial court had erred in light of Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. WilderneSs Soc'y,
421 U.S. 24@ (1975), but affirmed on the grounds of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). 550 F.2d at 465-66; 440 F. Supp. at 910, 913. The "private
attorney general" doctrine was thus replaced by the awarding of statutory fees. See text accom-
panying notes 70-74 infra..
12. Note, supra note 4, at 322.
13. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392-97 (1970); Note, supra note 4, at 322.
14. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392-97 (1970); Trustees v. Greenough,
105 U.S. 527, 536 (1881).
15. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). For a comprehensive discussion of the federal bad
faith exception, see Note, supra note 4.
16. See text accompanying note 24 infra.
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neys' fees to public interest litigation. 17 Its purpose was "to encourage liti-
gation aimed at vindicating strong national policies." "8
The origin of the private attorney general exception has been traced to
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 19 in which the United States Supreme Court
extended the common fund exception to a nonpecuniary action contesting
proxy solicitation in a corporate merger. 20  The Mills Court held that pre-
vailing plaintiffs may recover attorneys' fees under the common fund excep-
tion in cases in which the action benefits the members of an identifiable
class and the awarding of fees will spread the litigation costs among the
members of that class. 21  Mills seemed to completely endorse a "private
attorney general" exception since the Court applied the.common fund excep-
tion to a situation where suit was brought under a statute that did not specif-
ically authorize attorneys' fees. 22
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,2 3 however, the
Supreme Court abrogated the private attorney general concept 2 4 and held
17. Note, Attorney's Fees-Recovery by Prevailing Defendants in Title VII Actions, 13
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 630 (1977). See note 11 supra.
18. Note, supra note 17, at 630 n.24, quoting Note, supra note 11, at 733. For an in depth
discussion of the development of the "private attorney general" principle, see Dawson, Lawyers
and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1975); Comment,
supra note 5, at 655-81; Note, supra note 11, at 733.
19. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
20. Id. at 396-97. The Court authorized the award of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs who had
brought an action under federal securities law to prevent use of misleading proxy statements.
Id. at 389-97. The judgment did not create a monetary fund for either the plaintiff or the other
shareholders. Id. at 392.
21. Id. at 392-93. For a general discussion of Mills, see Hermann & Hoffmann, supra note
2, at 178-79.
22. Hermann & Hoffmann, supra note 2, at 179. The language used by the Mills Court
seemed to expand the common fund theory into a "common benefit" exception. See Dawson,
supra note 18, at 896-97. Professor Dawson suggests that Mills is more in the nature of "private
attorney general" litigation, although couched as a common benefit case. Id. at 895. Other
commentators, however, maintain that common benefit principles do not adequately explain the
policy justifications behind "private attorney general" actions-to encourage private enforce-
ment actions that raise issues of public policy and to provide sufficient compensation to attract
competent counsel. Hermann & Hoffmann, supra note 2, at 180 n.34. Though Hermann &
Hoffmann suggest that a theoretical common benefit to the public always results from this en-
forcement process, they contend that the common benefit analysis in Mills creates too restric-
tive a test on which to base financing of public interest litigation. Id.
23. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
24. Id. at 247-71. A citizens' environmental group sought to prevent the government from
issuing permits for the trans-Alaska pipeline. Id. at 241. The plaintiffs prevailed in the court of
appeals, but the litigation was subsequently terminated by federal legislation allowing the is-
suance of such permits to a pipeline corporation. Id. at 244-45. The court of appeals neverthe-
less held that the allowance of attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiffs was appeopriate since
the plaintiffs were acting as "private attorneys general" in attempting to vindicate important
statutory rights of all citizens. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir.
1974). The court stated:
In sum, the equities of this particular case support an award of attorneys' fees to the
successful plaintiffs-appellants. Acting as' private attorneys general, not only have they
ensured the proper functioning of our system of government, but they have advanced and
protected in a very concrete manner substantial public interest.
id.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed in a 5-2 decision, holding judicial reallocation of
the burdens of litigation without legislative guidance to be improper. 421 U.S. at 247. The
[VOL. 24: p. 215
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that absent an authorizing statute, federal courts' power to award fees is
limited to cases of bad faith or of benefit to a limited class of special bene-
ficiaries against whom the award is taxed. 25  Today, therefore, only the
bad faith and common fund exceptions are still viable. 26
2. Basis of a Court's Power to Make a Fee Award-Equity
The Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska clearly indicated that a federal
court must derive its authority to award fees from two distinct sources: 27  1)
its historic equity power; 28 or 2) a statute authorizing a fee award. 29  The
propriety of a fee application thus turns on the basis for or the nature of the
court's power to award fees. Alyeska reaffirmed the equitable common fund
and bad faith rationales for an award of attorneys' fees.30
The bad faith exception is derived from the historic equity jurisdiction
of the federal courts. 3 1 Attorneys' fee awards have been upheld by the Su-
preme Court against a party that deliberately disobeyed a court order, 32 and
against a recalcitrant employee whose default with respect to his employer's
claim was "willful and persistent." 33 In F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex
rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 34 the Supreme Court defined the bad faith ex-
ception: "We have long recognized that attorneys' fees may be awarded to a
successful party when his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wan-
tonly, or for oppressive reasons. "15
Court noted that common law limited the award of attorney fees to statutorily prescribed cases.
Id. at 247-49. Those cases arising under the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts were also
distinguished. Id. at 257-59. The Alyeska Court reasoned that even though traditional equitable
exceptions were products of the courts' inherent power, it is Congress' prerogative to determine
whether the protection of federal rights under a specific statute warrants the award of attorneys'
fees. Id. at 263-64, 269. The Court's decision, based on the long history of congressional control
over the award of attorneys' fees, posited that Congress has accepted the American rule, and
has made exceptions only under certain statutes that protect federal rights. Id. at 247-62, 269.
The Court also noted that although Congress has not done so, it has the power to forbid the
award of attorneys' fees under the bad faith and common fund exceptions. Id. at 259-60.
For a general discussion of Alyeska's impact on public interest practice, see Hermann &
Hoffmann, supra note 2, at 185-86.
25. See 421 U.S. 257-59; Hermann & Hoffmann, supra note 2, at 185, quoting Commission
on Civil Rights v. Romney, 518 F.2d 71, 72 (1st Cir. 1975).
26. See Walker, supra note 3, at 94-95.
27. 421 U.S. at 260. See text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra.
28. For a discussion of the courts' common law and equitable power to award fees, see notes
30-47 and accompanying text infra.
29. For a discussion of the courts' statutory power to award fees, see notes 48-113 and
accompanying text infra.
30. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
31. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-65 (1939).
32. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923).
33. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962).
34. 417 U.S. 116 (1974).
35. Id. at 129. The exception has received subsequent reindorsement by the circuit and
district courts. See, e.g., Haythe v. Decker Realty Co., 468 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1972); Horton v.
Lawrence County Bd. of Educ., 449 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1971); Seaman v. Spring Lake Park
Independent School Dist., 387 F. Supp. 1168 (D. Minn. 1974); Gilpin v. Kansas State High
School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1974) (supplemental memorandum order).
1978-1979]
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The authority for an award of fees under the equitable common fund
doctrine originated in Trustees v. Greenough.36  In Greenough, the Su-
preme Court applied the traditional equitable principle of unjust enrichment,
postulating that enrichment through another's loss is unjust and should be
restored. 37 In Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 3  the Supreme Court pos-
ited that these equitable powers may be used to compensate individuals
whose actions in commencing, pursuing, or settling litigation, even if taken
solely in their own name and for their own interest, benefit a class of per-
sons not participating in the litigation. 39  One equitable action for an award
of fees was vested in the plaintiff who brought suit and performed a service
benefiting other class members.40 A second equitable action for an award of
attorneys' fees belonged to the attorney since he had conferred a benefit
upon the class members, and the remaining class members should therefore
pay the amount which the court determined to be the reasonable value of
the services benefiting them.4 1 This principle was enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus.42 An attorney
thus has standing to assert the client's claim for fee reimbursement against
the fund 4 3 and is himself entitled to "reasonable compensation for [his or
her] professional services. ' ' aa
One commentator has analyzed the propriety of the common fund doc-
trine as follows:
The rationale underlying the common fund doctrine supports the
plaintiff's recovery of all but his or her share of the actual costs
incurred in conferring the benefit upon others, and supports re-
covery by the attorney of the market value of his or her time and
effort, to the extent not so compensated by the client.
4 5
The discretion of the court in determining the proper amount of a fee award
is therefore limited.4 6 The equitable cases discussed have indicated that
courts must exercise their power to prevent unjust enrichment both by ben-
efited class members and by' recipients of fee awards.4 7
B. Statutory Exceptions
To date, at least seventy-five federal statutes confer a right to recover
attornpys' fees. 48 Congress has provided a statutory basis for an award of
36. 105 U.S. 527 (1882). See note 11 supra.
37. 105 U.S. at 532.
38. 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
39. Id. at 167.
40. Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 127 (1885). 113 U.S. at 127.
41. Id. at 125.
42. 113 U.S. 116, 127.(1885). See text accompanying notes 40 & 41 supra.
43. Berger, supra note 2, at 300 (footnote omitted).
44. Id. For an in depth analysis, see id. at 298-300. See also Dawson, supra note 18, at 851.
45. Berger, supra note 2, at 300.
46. See Tranberg v. Tranberg, 456 F.2d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 1972).
47. See notes 36-46 and accompanying text supra.
48. For a compiliation of the seventy-five federal statutes that either authorize or mandate a
court to award attorneys' fees as part of the relief granted, see Berger, supra note 2, at 303
n.104.
[VOL. 24: p. 215
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attorneys' fees in. virtually every type of civil rights action.4 9 The most im-
portant and most frequently litigated statutes authorizing fee awards with
respect to civil rights litigation 50 are the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees
Awards Act of 1976 (Awards Act),51 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII), 5 2 and Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 11).
5 3
1. The Awards Act
The Awards Act provides for awards of attorneys' fees in suits predi-
cated upon sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, or 1986 54 as well as Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 55 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972.56
Section 1981 is used most commonly to challenge employment discrimi-
nation based on race, color, 57 and exclusionary admissions policies at recrea-
tional facilities. 58 Section 1982 is utilized to attack discrimination in prop-
erty transactions, such as the purchase of a home. 59  Section 1983 is utilized
to challenge policies, programs and practices under color of state law that
violate the Constitution of the United States. 60 Litigation under this section
has resulted in successful challenges to unconstitutional practices of school
boards, 6 1 state mental hospitals, 62 and local police. 63  Sections 1985 and
1986 are used to challenge public or private conspiracies that deprive indi-
viduals of the equal protection of the laws. 64  Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act prohibits the use of federal funds in a discriminatory manner and
requires recipients to administer those funds without regard to race, color,
49. Walker, supra note 3, at 97.
50. Id. at 100.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
52. Id. § 2000e-5(k).
53. Id. § 2000a-3(b).
54. See id. 9 1988; see also id. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986.
55. See id. 9 1988; id. §§ 2000d-2000d-6. See also SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 94th Cong., 2d Sess., CIVIL RIGHTS ATrORNEY'S FEES
AWARDS ACT OF 1976-SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DoCU-
MENTS 212-13 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SOURCE BOOK].
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976). See also SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 55, at 212-13.
57. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). See also SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 55, at 212.
58. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973). See also SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 55, at 212.
59. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See also SOURCE BOOK, supra
note 55, at 212.
60. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also SOURCE BOOK, supra note
55, at 212.
61. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); SOURCE BOOK, supra note 55, at
212-13.
62. See O'Conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). See also SOURCE BOOK, supra note
55, at 213.
63. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See also SOURCE BOOK, supra note 55, at
213.
64. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). See also SOURCE BOOK, supra note 55,
at 213.
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or national origin. 65 Finally, Title IX forbids discrimination on account of
sex, blindness, or visual impairment in certain federally assisted programs
and activities relating to education .66
The Awards Act does not apply to cases arising under Title II or Title
VII since those statutes contain attorneys' fees provisions. 67  Congress, how-
ever, followed the language of the Title II and Title VII provisions for reason-
able counsel fees to prevailing parties in enacting the Awards Act. 68  The
Awards Act "simply applies the type of 'fee-shifting' provision already con-
tained in Titles II and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to the other civil
rights statutes which do not already specifically authorize fee awards." 6 9
The Awards Act, passed in reaction to the Alyeska decision, 70 was de-
signed to remedy the anomaly in the civil rights laws whereby awards of fees
were available in some civil rights cases and unavailable in others. 71 During
the congressional hearings, it was stated that the "civil rights laws depend
heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have proved an essential
remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate
the important Congressional policies which these laws contain." 72 Congress
thus determined that if private citizens are to be able to assert their civil
rights, they must have the opportunity to recover their costs incurred in
vindicating these rights in court. 73 To effectuate this goal, Congress enacted
the Awards Act, which amended section 1988 and provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX .... or in any
civil action . . ". charging a violation of ... titleVI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the pre-
vailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs. 74
65. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
66. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 55, at 213.
67. See text accompanying notes 81 & 84 infra..
68. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 55, at 8-9.
69. Id. at 3 (remarks of Sen. Tunney).
70. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
71. REPORT OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908 [hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
See text accompanying notes 68 & 69 supra.
72. S. REP. at 2, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5910. Accord,
H. REP. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
73. S. REP. at 2, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5910. The Act
does not reverse Alyeska directly, as it does not provide for fees in the environmental statutes
underlying the Alyeska suits, but deals only with Alyeska's effect upon civil rights litigation.
Note, The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 205, 206
nn. 1-7 (1977). The Civil Rights Act of 1866, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1987, and
1988 (1976), and The Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986
(1976), were enacted to provide a federal remedy for the deprivation of federally protected
rights. Walker, supra note 3, at 97 & n.30.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Attorney fees are award-
able to the prevailing party by virtue of the enactment. Id.
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2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title V11 75 was enacted to ensure equal employment opportunity regard-
less of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. 76 The law prohibits
employers from failing or refusing to hire, discharging, discriminating, limit-
ing, segregating, or classifying applicants for employment in a detrimental
way on any of these bases. 77 Suits under Title VII include allegations of sex
discrimination, 78 race discrimination, 79 and discrimination due to national
origin. 80
Title VII contains its own attorney fee provision:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commis-
sion or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for
costs the same as a private person.81
3. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title 1182 is aimed at eliminating discrimination based on state laws
classifying persons on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin
in places of public accommodation.8 3 The Title II fee award provision pro-
vides in part: "In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee .... ."84
This statute was given a very liberal construction by the Supreme Court
in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises. s5 The Newman Court enunciated a
policy of "ordinarily" permitting fee awards, to anyone who has succeeded in
obtaining an injunction in a Title II suit,8 8 and held that a prevailing plaintiff
under Title II should be awarded attorneys' fees "unless special cir-
cumstances would render such an award unjust."8 7
This liberal view is limited in scope since the Newman Court based its
holding on the specific circumstances extant in a Title II case. The Court
stated that a successful Title II plaintiff obtains an injunction "not for himself
75. The fee awards provision is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
76. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
77. See Walker, supra note 3, at 99 n.45. Title VII also applies to employment agencies and
labor unions. Id.
78. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
79. See Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861
(1976).
80. See Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 825 (1975).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976) (emphasis added).
82. Id. § 2000a-1.
83. Id.
84. Id. § 2000a-3(b) (emphasis added).
85. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
86. Id. at 402.
87. Id. No such circumstances existed in Newman and the Court awarded "reasonable coun-
sel fees as part of the costs to be assessed against the respondents." Id. at 403.
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alone but also ... vindicat[es] a policy that Congress considered of the
highest priority." 88 The Court, however, noted that damages cannot be re-
covered under Title 11,89 and thus that few aggrieved parties would be in a
position to advance the public interest by bringing a Title II action.90 The
Court determined that it was this fact which motivated Congress to enact
the counsel fee provision of Title 11.91 In further support of this justification
for fees, the Court stated that the "bad faith" exception 92 would make the
fee provision unnecessary if that provision were simply designed to punish
litigants who deliberately advanced untenable arguments. 93
4. The Standards for Awarding Fees in Statutory Cases: Prevailing Plain-
tiffs v. Prevailing Defendants
The Awards Act, Title II, and Title VII provide a "prevailing party"
standard for awarding fees. 94  Another standard frequently utilized in civil
rights attorneys' fees award provisions, however, is that of "prevailing plain-
tiffs." 93 It would therefore seem that prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing de-
fendants would be included where the statute reads "prevailing party."
Nevertheless, the words "prevailing party" have been interpreted to present
a dual standard when applied to prevailing plaintiffs as opposed to prevailing
defendants. 96 While prevailing plaintiffs are eligible for fees under these
statutes as a matter of course, 9 7 "prevailing defendants are eligible only if
the litigation is deemed by a court to have been vexatious, brought for pur-
poses of harassment or otherwise brought in bad faith." 98
The Supreme Court has addressed the question of the proper standard
for allowing fees in civil rights cases only twice. In Newman, 99 the Court set
forth the liberal standard of allowing a prevailing plaintiff attorney's fees un-
less unjust, 100 and then applied that standard five years later to uphold a fee
88. Id. at 402.
89. d.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
93. 390 U.S. at 402 & n.4.
94. See text accompanying notes 74, 81 & 84 supra for the text of these statutory fee provi-
sions.
95. See, e.g., Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow
Cab, 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.
1970).
96. See Larson, The Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE
REv. 778, 779 (1977). Representative Drinan, the sponsor of the Awards Act and floor manager
of the House, used the term "dual standard" to describe the application of the prevailing party
language. See 122 CONG. REC. H12,160 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinan).
97. See Larson, supra note 96, at 779.
98. Id. See text accompanying note 108 infra.
99. See notes 85-93 and accompanying text supra.
100. 390 U.S. at 402. See notes 85-87 and accompanying text supra.
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award in Northcross v. Board of Education. 101 Underlying the Newman
rationale is the concept that nearly all plaintiffs in these suits are disadvan-
taged persons who are the victims of unlawful discrimination or unconstitu-
tional conduct, and that it would ordinarily be unfair to impose upon them
the additional burden of counsel fees when they seek to invoke the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts to vindicate their rights. 10 2  The Supreme Court
proceeded on the assumption that the burden upon successful plaintiffs of
bearing their own attorneys' fees would result in an inability on the part of
aggrieved parties to invoke the injunctive powers of the federal courts.10 3
Until recently, the courts of appeals had been divided on the issue of
which standard to employ in determining the appropriate fee award for pre-
vailing defendants in Title VII suits. 10 4  Some took the position that both
plaintiffs and defendants should be treated alike.' 0 5 Others, including the
Third Circuit, would approve defendants' applications for attorneys' fees only
when the plaintiff's suit was characterized by vexatiousness, bad faith, abu-
sive conduct, or an attempt to harass the opponent.' 08 The Supreme Court
finally settled this conflict in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 10 7
where it held that attorney's fees should be awarded to a prevailing defend-
ant only when the court concludes that plaintiffs claim was "frivolous, un-
reasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it
clearly became so."108
101. 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam). The attorney's fee provision at issue in North-
cross was contained in § 718 of the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617
(1976), which provides:
Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the United States against a local educa-
tional agency, a State (or any agency thereof), or the United States (or any agency
thereof), for failure to comply with any provision of this chapter or for discrimination on
the basis of race, color, or national origin in violation of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 . . . or the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States as they
pertain to elementary and secondary education, the court, in its discretion, upon a finding
that the proceedings were necessary to bring about compliance, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Id. (citation omitted).
102. See 390 U.S. at 402.
103. Id.
104. See text accompanying notes 105 & 106 infra.
105. See, e.g., EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 455-56 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
915 (1977); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 558 F.2d 742, 744 (5th Cir. 1977).
106. See Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976); Wright v. Stone Con-
tainer Corp., 524 F.2d 1058, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 1975); United States Steel Corp. v. United
States, 519 F.2d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 1975).
107. 434 U.S. 412 (1978). The Court was faced with a suit filed by the EEOC against defend-
ant two years after the Commission had notified the complainant of her right to sue. Id. at
414. The complainant had not pursued this right. Id. Jurisdiction was alleged under Title VII,
as amended in 1972, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant
after finding that the case was not "pending" at the time of the passage of the amendments. Id.
Defendant then petitioned for an attorneys' fee award under the statutory provisions, but the
district court concluded that "the Commission's action in bringing the suit cannot be charac-
terized as unreasonable or meritless," and refused to award a fee. Id. at 415 (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 424.
108. Id. at 422. See text accompanying notes 183-85 infra.
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5. Summary of a Court's Power to Make a Fee Award
After Alyeska, federal courts do not have the power to award attorneys'
fees absent the presence of a common fund or bad faith unless such power
has been specifically granted by the statute under which the plaintiff seeks
relief. ' 0 9 In the statutory cases, courts must award fees which further the
congressional intent of promoting full enforcement of the substantive rights
safeguarded by the statute. 110
III. THE REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE-
DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT TO
BE AWARDED
While the entitlement standards which govern an award of attorneys'
fees vary,"' the language in virtually all of the statutes pertaining to the
amount of such an award states that "reasonable" attorneys' fees should be
awarded.1 2 Regardless of whether a court is proceeding under statutory or
equitable authority, its decision to award attorneys' fees necessitates the de-
termination of a reasonable amount for such a fee. 113
The United States Supreme Court, however, has not yet decided the
issue of the manner in which the fee amount should be determined. 114
Consequently, the approaches taken by the courts of appeals reflect different
standards for ascertaining fee awards. 115 For example, while the First Cir-
cuit leaves the manner in which fee awards are determined almost entirely
to the discretion of the district court, 1 1 6 the Fifth '17 and Seventh 118 Circuits
109. See notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra.
110. Berger, supra note 2, at 310. See notes 54-66, 76-80, 83 & 85-93 and accompanying text
supra.
111. See text accompanying notes 74, 81, 84 & 95-108 supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 74, 81 & 84 supra.
113. See notes 114-23 and accompanying text infra.
114. The Supreme Court has never directly considered a question involving the proper
amount of a fee award, although it has dealt with entitlement to fees in particular cases. See,
e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (§ 1988 award of attorneys' fees); Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Title VII award of attorneys' fees); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (private attorney general award of attorneys' fees); F.D.
Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974) (equitable rationale for awarding fees in
commercial litigation); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (award of attorneys'
fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976)); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973) (equitable rationale for
awarding fees under common benefit rationale); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375
(1970) (award of attorneys' fees under common benefit rationale); Newman v. Piggie Park En-
terprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (Title II award of attorneys' fees); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967) (equitable rationale for'awarding fees under bad faith
doctrine); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) (equitable common fund award of
attorneys' fees); Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885) (equitable common
fund of award of attorneys' fees); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882) (equitable com-
mon fund award of attorneys' fees).
115. For a discussion of the varying approaches taken by the courts of appeals, see notes
116-237 and accompanying text infra.
116. Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219, 221 (1st Cir. 1974).
117. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
118. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1322 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
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have promulgated lists of factors to be considered by the district courts in
setting fees. 119 Moreover, the circuits have often allowed district courts to
make fee determinations without articulating the reasons for a particular fee
award,120 a practice which has led to widespread confusion. 121 In response
thereto, the Third Circuit has pioneered a shift in approach by adopting a
particular analytical framework for determining fees.1 22  By issuing a series
119. The list of factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714,
717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), is based upon private fee arrangement guidelines adopted in the ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DIscIPLINARY RULE 2-106(B), and is that most fre-
quently cited. The Johnson court listed twelve factors for the court to consider in arriving at a
reasonable fee: 1) the time and labor required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 3)
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 4) the preclusion of other employment
by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; 5) the customary fee; 6) whether the fee is fixed
or contingent; 7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; 8) the amount
involved and the results obtained; 9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; 10)
the "'undesirability" of the case; 11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client; and 12) awards in similar cases. 488 F.2d at 717-19.
Almost every court considering an award of attorney's fees adheres to some combination of
the Johnson factors. See, e.g., Firebird Soc'y v. Board of Fire Comm'rs, 556 F.2d 642, 643-44
(2d Cir. 1977); Firefighters Inst. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 516 (8th Cir. 1977); Steven-
son v. Int'l Paper Co., 432 F. Supp. 390, 409-10 (W.D. La. 1977).
120. Berger, supra note 2, at 284. One commentator who has examined this area maintains
that until recently the most common approach in setting fees was no approach at all. See id. He
states: "A review of all decisions reported in volumes 384-94 of Federal Supplement (1974-1975)
reveals that of the twenty-eight reported cases involving a fee determination, thirteen contain
absolutely no articulated reason for the amount awarded." Id. A typical example cited by this
commentator is a case awarding reasonable attorneys' fees and merely stating: "The court finds
that $2,750.00 is a fair and reasonable attorney's fee for legal services rendered to and for
plaintiffs by their counsel in this suit; and Plaintiffs are entitled to recover such reasonable
attorney's fee in such amount from the Defendants." Canterbury v. Dick, 385 F. Supp. 1004,
1009 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
121. In response thereto, most of the circuits now hold that failure to comprehensively state
the reasons for a fee award renders the district court's determination effectively unreviewable
and constitutes an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, 526 F.2d 67,
69-70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 505 F.2d
105, 108-09 (6th Cir. 1974); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 187-88 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1322 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d
714, 720 (5th Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1973).
122. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487
F.2d 161, 166-67 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy 1). The Lindy I court stated: "The mere listing of four
factors for consideration by the court makes meaningful review difficult and gives little guidance
to attorneys and claimants." Id.
The Third Circuit initially developed an analytical framework to be used by lower courts in
setting fees in fund cases by awarding fees based upon the normal hourly rate for the time
expended, adjusted for the contingency of the case and the quality of the attorney's effort as
reflected in the court's evaluation of the work it observed, the complexity of the issues, and the
result achieved. See id. at 166-69. See also Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976); Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515
F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1975); Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 493 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1974). See
notes 123-50 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of these cases.
The Third Circuit then developed a "post Lindy discretionary adjustment," to be used by
the district court in setting fees in statutory civil rights cases. See Prandini v. National Tea Co.,
585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1978) (award of attorneys' fees in Title VII class action settlement); Hughes
v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978) (award of attorneys' fees under the Awards Act in § 1982
case); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977). For a discussion of these
cases, see notes 151-215 and accompanying text infra.
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of decisions during the past five years, the Third Circuit has formulated
definitional and interpretive guidelines to be used by the lower courts in
making fee determinations. 123 The first of these decisions to be examined
here is Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp. (Lindy 1).124
A. Decisional Guidelines Regarding Attorney
Fee Awards in the Third Circuit
1. Lindy I
In Lindy I, 1 2 5 which arose from a series of antitrust class actions, 126 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had
awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to the equitable common fund doctrine.1 2 7
123. For a discussion of the fee framework and guidelines enunciated by the Third Circuit,
see notes 124-215 and accompanying text infra.
124. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
125. Id. Lindy I involved the propriety of the district court's award of attorneys'
fees from a settlement fund created in a series of plumbing fixture antitrust actions.
Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Santiary Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1077
(E.D. Pa. 1972). The United States had obtained criminal antitrust indictments against plumb-
ing fixture manufacturers and their trade association. Id. at 1079. Subsequently, some 370 pri-
vate treble damage actions were filed against the same defendants. Id. The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation then ordered the cases consolidated before a single district court judge.
Id. The actions were settled, at which time the district court awarded fees to plaintiffs attorneys
and their respective firms. Id. at 1085-92. The district court deemed this award to be the
contribution that those individuals not represented by counsel yet sharing in the settlement
should make to the cost of the litigation. Id. The award was therefore to come from their share
of the settlement. Id. Two members of the class objected to this award and appealed. See 487
F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy I).
The Third Circuit reserved judgment on the question of whether the private clients could
credit these monies received by the class attorneys from the fund against their own fee pay-
ments. 487 F.2d at 166, 169. On remand, the district court determined that the fees paid under
the private agreements should be subtracted from the court's award and thus directed that the
unrepresented class pay only $925,968.61 of the total award of $1,134,765.45. Lindy Bros. Build-
ers, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 382 F. Supp. 999, 1023-28 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).
126. See note 125 supra.
127. See id. For a discussion of the equitable common fund theory of awarding fees, see notes
11-14, 20-26, 30 & 36-47 and accompanying text supra.
The Third Circuit in Lindy I stated:
The award of fees under the equitable [common] fund doctrine is analogous to an
action in quantum meruit: the individual seeking compensation has, by his actions, bene-
fited another and seeks payment for the value of the service performed. Understood in
this way, there are two possible 'causes of action' that may be urged as the basis for award
of attorneys' fees. One of these 'causes' belongs to the plaintiff who brought the underly-
ing suit. His claim is that by instituting the suit he has performed a service benefiting
other class members ...
487 F.2d at 165, citing Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). The court further stated:
The second 'cause of action' for award of attorneys' fees under the equitable fund
doctrine belongs to the attorney. The attorney's claim is that his conduct of the suit
conferred a benefit on all the class members, that one or more class members has agreed
by contract to pay for the benefit the attorney conferred upon him, and that the remain-
ing class members should pay what the court determines to be the reasonable value of the
services benefiting them.
Id., citing Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 120-21 (1885).
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In reviewing this award, the Third Circuit introduced what it termed the
"lodestar" method of calculating attorneys' fees for the time they devoted to
the lawsuit.1 28 In order to ascertain this amount, an initial determination of
"how many hours were spent in what manner by which attorneys" had to be
made.1 29 The second step was to fix a reasonable hourly rate for the time
each lawyer spent, taking into account his or her reputation, status, and
normal billing rate. 130 The hourly rate should then be multiplied by the
number of hours spent by the attorneys. 13 1  The resulting figure, or the
lodestar, was then subjected to adjustments for the contingency of defeat
and for unusual quality in the legal skills employed. 132  In order to make
the adjustment for quality, the following factors were considered: 1) the
complexity and novelty of the issues presented; 2) the quality of the work
that the judge has been able to observe; and 3) the amount of the recovery
obtained.133 Furthermore, the Third Circuit emphasized that in determining
a fee, the district court should document as specifically as possible the facts
that support its conclusion.134
128. Id. at 167-68.
129. Id. at 167. The court enunciated the criteria for attorneys' fees as follows:
In detailing the standards that should guide the award of fees, . . . we must start from the
purpose of the award: to compensate the attorney for the reasonable value of the attor-
ney's services. . . . Before the value of the attorney's services can be determined, the
district court must ascertain just what were those services. To this end the first inquiry of
the court should be into the hours spent by the attorneys.
Id.
130. Id. The court stated:
After determining . . . the services performed by the attorneys, the district court
must attempt to value those services.
A logical beginning in valuing an attorney's services is to fix a reasonable hourly rate
for his time-taking account of the attorney's legal reputation and status (partner, as-
sociate). Where several attorneys file a joint petition for fees, the court may find it neces-
sary to use several different rates for the different attorneys. Similarly, the court may find
that the reasonable rate of compensation differs for different activities.
Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 168. The court then stated:
While the amount thus found to constitute reasonable compensation should be the
lodestar of the court's fee determination, there are at least two other factors that must be
taken into account in computing the value of attorneys' services. The first of these is the
contingent nature of success. . . . In assessing the extent to which the attorneys' compen-
sation should be increased to reflect the unlikelihood of success, the district court should
consider any information that may help to establish the probability of success.
The second additional factor the district court must consider is the extent, if any, to
which the quality of an attorney's work mandates increasing or decreasing the amount to
which the court has found the attorney reasonably entitled.
id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 169. The court pointed out that the value to be placed on these additional factors
will vary from case to case. Id. However, the court stated that their value will often bear a
reasonable relationship to the aggregate hourly compensation. Id.
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2. Lindy II
Having set forth the standards and guidelines governing an award of
attorneys' fees in cases in which an attorney's action leads to the creation of
an equitable fund in Lindy I, 135 the Third Circuit refined these formulations
in Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp. (Lindy II).136 At the outset, the court emphasized that it did not
intend for district courts, in setting attorneys' fees, to "become enmeshed in
a meticulous analysis of every detailed facet of the professional representa-
tion." 137 It determined, however, that once the district court in an equita-
ble fund case determined the lodestar, it should inquire separately into the
contingency and quality factors and should make specific findings of fact as to
each. 1 3 8 The Third Circuit specified factors relevant to what Lindy I termed
"contingent nature of success," 139 pursuant to which the court may increase
the amount established in the computation of the lodestar.140 It stated that
the district court should appraise the professional burden undertaken in
terms of the probability or likelihood of success 141 on the basis of a careful
evaluation of the following factors: 1) an analysis of the plaintiffs burden; 142
135. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). See notes 125-34 and accompanying text supra.
136. 540 F.2d 102, 116-18 (3d Cir. 1976). The court therein stated: "Preliminarily, we reaf-
firm the standards enunciated in Lindy I." Id. at 116 (citation omitted). It went on to state that
"[n]othing in the augmentation hereinafter set forth should be considered as a dilution or dim-
inution of that basic formula." Id. The court added that "we view the foregoing as an implemen-
tation of the Lindy I formulation." Id. at 118.
In its opinion on remand of Lindy 1, the district court had determined that appellees were
entitled to attorneys' fees of $1,134,765.45 from the settlement fund then valued at $29.3 mil-
lion. See 382 F. Supp. at 1024 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See note 123, supra. Of this amount the district
court ordered members of the third category-the previously unrepresented claimants-to pay
$925,968.61. 382 F. Supp. at 1028.
137. 540 F.2d at 116. The Third Circuit deferred to the trial court's discretion regarding the
hourly rate and the multiplier factor, which the trial court based on the quality of the legal
services and the contingent risk. Id. at 114-15. The Third Circuit also concluded that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion by doubling the lodestar. Id. at 115-16.
138. Id. at 117. With respect to the quality factor set forth in Lindy I, see text accompanying
notes 132 & 133 supra, the Lindy II court stated it did not intend for a district court to inquire
separately into the components of the legal representation, e.g., pleadings, discovery, court
appearances, etc. 540 F.2d at 117. Rather, it meant "only that consideration of the quality factor
should relate to the overall conduct of the specific case before the court, to wit, 'that particular
work,' 'that given activity' for which the fee is awarded." Id. (emphasis supplied by the court)
(citation omitted).
139. 540 F.2d at 116-17. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
140. 540 F.2d at 117.
141. Id. Likelihood of success is to be viewed at the time of filing of suit. Id.
142. Id. The court stated:
Subsumed in this category are the following considerations: (a) the complexity of the
case,-legally and factually; (b) the probability of defendant's liability,-whether it is
clear or dubious; whether it has been previously suggested by other civil or criminal
proceedings; whether it is asserted under existing case law or statutory interpretation, or
is advanced as a novel theory; (c) an evaluation of damages,-whether the claims would
be difficult or easy to prove.
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2) the risks assumed in developing the case; 1 43 and 3) the delay in receipt of
payment for services rendered. 1
4 4
Under the rubric of "the quality of an attorney's work," 145 the Third
Circuit stated in Lindy II that the quality of an attorney's work in general is
itself a component of the reasonable hourly rate, 146 and that Lindy I permits
an adjustment to the lodestar commensurate with the lawyer's degree of skill
relative to that expected for lawyers of the caliber reflected in the hourly
rates. 14 7 The court considered such increase or decrease to be in the nature
of a "bonus" or "penalty." 148 The Lindy II court further explained that in
determining whether or not to adjust the lodestar for quality of work, the
district court may consider: 1) the result obtained by verdict or settlement,
as evaluated in terms of potential money damages available to the class as
well as the benefit conferred on the class; 1 49 and 2) the professional methods
utilized in processing the case, rewarding efficiency and penalizing obstruc-
tion or delay.150
B. Recent Decisions in the Third Circuit
1. Hughes v. Repko
In Hughes v. Repko,151 plaintiffs, husband and wife, appealed from an
order of the district court awarding them attorneys' fees after they obtained
143. Id. The court further stated:
This category subsumes consideration of: (a) the number of hours of labor risked
without guarantee of remuneration; (b) the amount of out-of-pocket expenses advanced for
processing motions, taking depositions, etc.; (c) the development of prior expertise in the
particular type of litigation; recognizing that counsel sometimes develop, without compen-
sation, special legal skills which may assist the court in efficient conduct of the litigation,
or which may aid the court in articulating legal precepts and implementing sound public
policy.
Id.
144. Id. Finally, the court stated:
If, having considered the foregoing or other relevant criteria, the district court
desires to increase the "lodestar" award, it should identify those factors supporting its
conclusion, state the specific amount by which the basic fee should be increased due to
the contingency of success, and give a brief statement of reasons therefor. We reiterate
that any such increment in the "lodestar" award is to be considered and applied apart
from the evaluation of the quality of services rendered in the particular proceedings.
Id.
145. Id. See notes 132 & 133 and accompanying text supra.
146. 540 F.2d at 117.
147. Id. at 118 (citation omitted). The court stated that the increase or decrease in the lode-
star reflects exceptional services only. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citation omitted).
150. Id. The court then allocated the fee award in accordance with the refined Lindy I
criteria. Id. at 118-22.
Judge Gibbons, in a dissent joined by Chief Judge Seitz, took a more conservative position,
arguing that since three defendants had been previously convicted, some recovery was "virtually
certain." Id. at 127-28 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Given that
proposition, the dissenters concluded that a "substantial" departure from the lodestar figure was
not appropriate. Id. However, this seems to imply that some premium, albeit small, was de-
served. See id. at 129 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
151. 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978).
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a jury verdict against one of two defendants in a section 1982 action. 152
Plaintiffs argued on appeal that the amount of their award was insuffi-
cient. 153 The victorious defendant also appealed, arguing that he was a pre-
vailing party within the meaning of the Awards Act. 1 54
Plaintiffs had asserted two claims against each of the defendants, one
alleging discrimination in violation of section 1982 15 and the other alleging
a conspiracy in violation of section 1985.15' The district court directed a
verdict in favor of both defendants on plaintiffs' section 1985 claim,' 5 7 and
directed a verdict for one defendant on the section 1982 claim. 158 It there-
upon awarded attorneys' fees in accordance with the Awards Act,'5 9 pur-
porting to follow the principles announced in Lindy 11. 160 When plaintiffs
attacked the legal bases for the district court's fee determination in their
appeal,' 6 1 the Third Circuit once again analyzed the proper method for
calculating the lodestar in such circumstances.
162
0
152. Id. at 485. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). Plaintiffs, black citizens, instituted this action
for damages against defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Repko, white citizens, "alleging that the defend-
ants refused to rent them an apartment owned by Mrs. Repko because they were black." 578
F.2d at 485.
153. Id. at 486.
154. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
155. 578 F.2d at 485. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
156. 578 F.2d at 485. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976).
157. 578 F.2d at 485.
158. Id. The successful defendant on the § 1982 claim was Mr. Repko. See note 152 supra.
At the time plaintiffs' counsel was retained, he agreed with his clients that his fee would be
limited to any amount awarded by the court. 578 F.2d at 485. Plaintiffs' counsel applied for a
fee of $3,850, based on 55 hours of legal service at $70.00 per hour. Id. The number of hours
spent and the hourly rate appear to have been found reasonable by the district court and were
not challenged on appeal. Id. See Hughes v. Repko, 429 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
159. 578 F.2d at 485. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). For a discussion of the Awards Act, see
notes 54-74 and accompanying text supra.
160. 578 F.2d at 486. For a discussion of Lindy II, see notes 135-50 and accompanying text
supra.
The district court decided that the amount of the lodestar (hours of service multiplied by
hourly rate) "should be proportionate to the extent the plaintiffs prevailed in the suit." Hughes
v. Repko, 429 F. Supp. 928, 932 (W.D. Pa. 1977). It found that defendants prevailed on over
two-thirds of the legal issues involved, and proceeded to reduce the lodestar by approximately
two-thirds, to a net figure of $1,275.00. Id.
The district court also considered other factors which it felt should affect the lodestar in
terms of the quality of counsel's work and the contingency of success. Id. It found the quality of
the work to have been "good," but the case a "simple" one. Id. The district court also decided
that the "contingency factor" was largely absent because plaintiffs' counsel showed his confi-
dence of success by not entering into a contingent fee contract with his clients. Id. Finally, the
district court felt that plaintiffs' ability to pay their counsel was a factor to be considered in
reducing the lodestar, because Congress had mandated recognition of that factor under the Fair
Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976), an act the court said provided a remedy
similar to that accorded by § 1982. 429 F. Supp. at 933. Based on its consideration of the
foregoing factors, the district court concluded that the lodestar should be reduced further, and
awarded plaintiffs' counsel a fee of $700.00, rather than the initial $3,850.00 requested. Id.
161. 578 F.2d at 486.
162. Id. See also Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lindy II); Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165 (3d Cir.
1975); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy I).
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a. Prevailing Party
After stating that the critical first step in fixing a reasonable attorneys'
fee under the Awards Act is the determination of the lodestar,1 6 3 the Third
Circuit held that the district court's automatic reduction of two-thirds of the
lodestar since plaintiffs had not prevailed on two-thirds of their claims was
legally impermissible. 16 4  In interpreting the "prevailing party" language of
the Awards Act,' 6 5 the court recognized that it is not always easy to deter-
mine the prevailing party, particularly where there are multiple claims
and/or multiple parties, and where the petitioning party is not completely
successful.166  The Hughes court stated, however, that "to apply the 'pre-
vailing party' language of the ... [Awards Act] fairly, we think district
courts should analyze the results obtained by th6 petitioning party on par-
ticular claims regardless of the number of parties," 167 and should consider
the prevailing party to be the one who can be said to have essentially suc-
ceeded on such claims.' 6 8
While the Third Circuit stated that a fee petitioner who is totally unsuc-
cessful in asserting a claim cannot be treated as a "prevailing party" within
the spirit of the Awards Act,' 6 9 it concluded that plaintiffs in the instant case
should be treated as prevailing parties because they had essentially prevailed
on their section 1982 claim against one defendant, even though all aspects of
their claims were not successful. 170  The court, therefore, held that where a
party has succeeded on only some of its claims, Lindy I demanded that the
district court specifically determine the number of hours spent on the suc-
cessful claim.171 The Hughes court thus considered an automatic percentage
reduction in the lodestar and an unanalyzed allocation of hours in calculating
the lodestar to be "legally impermissible."' 172
163. 578 F.2d at 487.
164. Id. See note 160 supra. See also Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 52 (3d Cir.
1978). For a discussion of Prandini, see notes 186-215 and accompanying text infra.
165. 578 F.2d at 487. For the pertinent text of the Awards Act, see text accompanying note
74 supra.
166. 578 F.2d at 486.
167. Id. The court stated that "claim" is meant as "claim" is used in FED. R. Csv. P. 10(b).
Id. at 487.
168. 578 F.2d at 486-87.
169. Id. Since the plaintiffs were denied punitive damages, they were not totally successful
on their § 1982 action. Id. Yet they were essentially successful because they won the verdict
and obtained an award. Id.
170. id.
171. Id. at 487.
172. Id. The court stated:
In evaluating what laws are reasonably supportive, we believe Lindy II and Merola II
require the district court to determine not only the number of hours actually devoted to
the successful claims, but also whether it was reasonably necessary to spend that number
of hours in order to perfrom the legal services for which compensation was sought.
Id. In Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1975) (Merola II), the Third
Circuit had declared that the quality of the attorney's work factor is
evidenced by the work observed, the complexity of the issues and the recovery obtained.
In settled cases, the second additional factor [quality] is reflected largely in the benefit
produced. It permits the court to recognize and reward achievements of a particularly
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The Third Circuit also found no support in Lindy II for the proposition
that the lodestar should be reduced due to the simplicity of the case.
173
Furthermore, the court held that the Awards Act, which is explicitly applic-
able to fees awarded in successful actions under section 1982,174 does not
consider the ability to pay a factor in determining the amount of a fee
award. 175
With respect to the factors that should be considered in arriving at a
reasonable fee, the court noted that the congressional history of the Awards
Act 176 as well as the factors enumerated by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 177 offer some guidance. 178  It noted, how-
ever, that the factors mentioned in the congressional history and the case
law in connection with the determination of "reasonableness" are the same
factors that would have been considered by the district court when calculat-
ing the lodestar through a determination of the number of hours reasonably
supportive of successful claims and the establishment of the reasonable
hourly rate. 179
Finally, with respect to the lodestar, the Third Circuit emphasized, as
did Congress when it enacted the Awards Act,' 8 0 that the district court
resourceful attorney who secures a substantial benefit for his clients with a minimum of
time invested, or to reduce the objectively determined fee where the benefit produced
does not warrant awarding the full value of the time expended.
Id. at 168-69. See 487 F.2d at 168.
173. 578 F.2d at 487. The court also stated that there was no support in Merola v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1975), for a lodestar reduction because of simplicity. Id.
See note 172 supra. On the other hand, the court stated that simplicity of the issues involved
should be reflected in the court's determination of the hours reasonably devoted to the success-
ful claims, a determination that must be made in arriving at the lodestar itself. 578 F.2d at 487.
Any other approach would penalize attorneys regardless of the number of hours reasonably
devoted to successful claims. Id.
174. 578 F.2d at 488. See text accompanying notes 54 & 74 supra.
175. 578 F.2d at 488.
176. Id. & n.7. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
177. 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). See notes 117 & 119 and accompanying text supra.
178. 578 F.2d at 488 & n.7. The court stated:
For example, the House Judiciary Committee Report stated: The third principal ele-
ment of the bill is that the prevailing party is entitled to 'reasonable' counsel fees. The
courts have enumerated a number of factors in determining the reasonableness of awards
under similarly worded attorney's fee provisions. InJohnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), for example, the court listed twelve factors to be
considered. . . . Accord: Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
see also United States Steel Corp. v. United States [519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975)].
Id., citing H. IfEP. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976).
179. 578 F.2d at 488.
180. Id. & n.8 The Third Circuit noted that the Awards Act was passed in response to
Aleyska, and that Congress was recognizing the importance of private vindication of civil rights.
Id. See notes 70-73 and accompanying text supra. The court quoted the following:
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to enforce
the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be
able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws are
not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it
costs them to vindicate these rights in court.
578 F.2d 488 n.8 quoting S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5910. Accord, H. REP. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1976).
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should evaluate the fee to be awarded in light of the important substantive
purposes of the Civil Rights Act upon which plaintiffs relied.""' It did not,
however, identify the underlying substantive purposes of section 1982.182
b. Defendant's Appeal
With respect to the prevailing defendant's claim for an attorneys' fee
award, 8 3 the Third Circuit recognized that a prevailing defendant may in
certain circumstances recover his fees in light of the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement in Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC. 184 The Hughes
court, however, held that since this action was not brought to harass, em-
barrass, or abuse defendants, it was not the type of case for which the Su-
preme Court mandated recovery of fees for prevailing defendants. 185
2. Prandini v. National Tea Co.
In Prandini v. National Tea Co. (Prandini II),186 the Third Circuit was
faced with a second appeal 187 concerning the award of attorneys' fees pur-
suant to a settlement of a Title VII class action.1 8 8 The attorneys who had
represented plaintiffs made the following contentions regarding the district
court's fee award: 1) that the district court erred in making a percentage
reduction based on alleged duplication of services between the instant case
181. 578 F.2d 489, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). See text accompanying note 155 supra.
182. Presumably, the court had in mind the strong policy of providing private citizens with
an opportunity to assert their civil rights and recover the cost to do so. See text accompanying
notes 54, 59 & 70-74 supra.
183. See text accompanying note 154 supra.
184. 578 F.2d at 487, citing Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
For a discussion of Christianburg, see notes 107 & 108 and accompanying text supra.
185. 578 F.2d at 489. See note 108 and accompanying text supra. For an outline of the
majority opinion in Hughes, setting out with particularity the operation by which a district court
is to award attorneys' fees in the nonfund context, see 578 F.2d at 489 (Rosenn, J., concurring);
id. at 491 (Garth, J., concurring).
186. 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1978).
187. See Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977) (Prandini I). In Prandini I,
the Third Circuit had merely announced a supervisory rule requiring that in settlements of
cases involving statutorily authorized attorneys' fees, the damage settlement in favor of the
plaintiffs should be made first and separate from the award of attorneys' fees. Id. at 1021. Only
after court approval of the damage settlement should negotiation for appropriate attorneys' fees
begin. Id.
188. 585 F.2d at 49. See notes 75-81 and accompanying text supra. The settlement involved
two funds-a "damages fund" payable in full to plaintiffs, and an "attorneys' fees fund" payable
as approved by the court to the attorneys. 585 F.2d at 49. "Defendant National Tea Co. (Na-
tional) had settled the plaintiff's claims by agreeing to pay the plaintiff class approximately
$100,000.00, plus expenses (calculated at $18,000.00)." Id. "The settlement also provided that
National would pay reasonable attorneys' fees as awarded by the district court, up to
$50,000.00." Id. To the extent that the "attorneys' fees fund" exceeded the amount awarded as
reasonable by the district court, that excess would revert back to defendants. id.
After a hearing on attorneys' fees, the district court awarded a total of $35,000.00 in fees.
Id. On appeal, the court vacated the district court judgment and remanded for further proceed-
ings, holding that the district court had not made the findings required by Lindy 1, Lindy II,
and Prandini 1. Id.
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and another; 189 and 2) that the district court erred by refusing to award a
fee for the successful appeal of the first fee award and the time spent in the
preparation of the fee petition. 190
In sustaining appellants' first contention, 19 1 the court restated its hold-
ing in Hughes: 192 "The clear thrust of Hughes is that district courts, in
awarding attorneys' fees, may not reduce an award by a particular per-
centage or amount (albeit for justifiable reasons) in an arbitrary or indis-
criminate fashion ... it must make specific findings to support its ac-
tion." 193 The court further emphasized "the importance this Circuit has
placed upon the need to identify specifically the lodestar components," 194
stating:
It is true that our decisions concerning attorneys' fees have in each
instance required an analysis to be made of hours and rates. Yet
until Hughes we had not clearly required that the allocation of
hours for the purpose of determining the lodestar be analyzed so
precisely, nor had we held that an automatic percentage reduction
in the lodestar is 'legally impermissible.' 195
With respect to the contention that the successful appeal of the first fee
award, and the time spent preparing the fee petition therefore, should be
compensated, 196 the Third Circuit stated that the district court was in error
in relying on Lindy II to justify withholding such compensation. 1 97  The
. 189. 585 F.2d at 51-52. The district court also reduced the number of hours by 10 percent
for all attorneys except one. Id. at 50. The reduction was based on a purported overlapping of
work with prior counsel in a prior and nearly identical case. Id.
190. Id. at 52-54. The district court had refused to award any attorneys' fees for the time
spent in successfully appealing the first fee award and in preparation of fee petitions. Id. at 50.
The district court also reduced the attorneys' hourly rate from $60 to $40. Id. The attorneys
argued on appeal that this reduction had been impermissibly based upon the district court's
belief that the attorneys had engaged in a fee splitting arrangement in violation of the CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULE 2-107(A)(2). 585 F.2d at 50. The majority
found that the district court had not relied upon this factor, however, but rather that the district
judge felt that, since the attorneys were willing to pay another attorney $20 per hour for doing
no work, they only valued their services at $40 per hour. Id. The court thus found this to be a
permissible reduction. Id.
The Third Circuit in Prandini II did not decide the issue of whether a district court, in
awarding attorneys' fees, may consider an attorney's unethical conduct as a factor in its determi-
nation of a "reasonable" fee. 585 F.2d at 50 n.3. It did state, however, that it was inclined
toward the view that it is within the district court's discretion to do so. Id., citing Hughes v.
Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 491-93 (3d Cir. 1978) (Garth, J., concurring).
191. See note 189 and accompanying text supra. The court found that the evidence on the
record did not support the percentage reduction imposed by the district court. 585 F.2d at 51.
192. 585 F.2d at 51-52. See notes 170-72 and accompanying text supra.
193. 585 F.2d at 52, citing In re Meade Land and Dev. Co., 577 F.2d 853 (3d
Cir. 1978). The court held that since the district court made no specific findings of duplication
or overlap, that portion of the opinion reducing the award by an overall 10 percent must be
reversed. 585 F.2d at 52.
194. 585 F.2d at 52 (emphasis supplied by the court).
195. Id., citing Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978).
196. See note 190 and accompanying text supra.
197. 585 F.2d at 52. The district court had concluded that the case was controlled by Lindy
II, wherein it was held: "[t]here being no benefit to the fund from services performed by
[attorneys] in connection with their fee application, there should be no attorneys' fee award
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Third Circuit distinguished Lindy II from the instant case on the basis that
Lindy II was an equitable common fund case, and, as such, attorneys' fees
were paid out of the fund.198 Any increase in attorneys' fees in such a case
would necessarily result in a decrease in plaintiffs' actual recovery. 199 The
court noted that while attorneys' fees are nevertheless awarded out of the
fund in such cases since the attorneys' services benefitted the fund by creat-
ing, increasing, or preserving it,2 0 0 an attorney's time expended in connec-
tion with the fee application or a fee appeal could not justifiably be compen-
sated out of the fund since such services do not benefit the fund. 201 Indeed,
the court determined that it is at this point that the attorney's interest
becomes adverse to the interests of the class which he represents.20 2
The Third Circuit stated, however, that such a rationale is inapposite in
the instant case since it is not an equitable fund case. 20 3 The court held that
in cases involving a statutorily authorized attorneys' fee award,20 4 the con-
siderations of Lindy II and the equitable fund cases do not apply.20 5 The
Prandini II court thus held that the attorneys were entitled to be compen-
sated for time spent in successfully appealing the fee award and in preparing
the fee petition.2 0 6  In distinguishing Prandini II from Lindy II, the court
viewed as dispositive the fact that any of the money awarded for fees which
is not actually allocated to the attorney would not augment the amount of
plaintiffs' settlement fund,2 0 7 as it would in the common fund situation, but
rather would be returned to the defendant. 20 8
Finally, the court outlined the policy reason supporting this ruling.2 0 9
Recognizing that "[i]f an attorney is required to expend time litigating his
fee claim, yet may not be compensated for that time, the attorney's effective
rate for the hours expended on the case will be decreased," 210 the Third
from the fund for these services." Id. (citation omitted). See text accompanying notes 41-45
supra.
198. 585 F.2d at 52 (citation omitted). See note 127 supra.
199. 585 F.2d at 52 (citation omitted).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 53.
202. Id., citing Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020 (3d Cir. 1977).
203. 585 F.2d at 53.
204. Id. The $50,000.00 ceiling on the ultimate fee which could be awarded (characterizing it
as a "fund") does not implicate Lindy I1. Id. See note 188 and accompanying text supra. The
court determined that the $50,000.00 ceiling signifies only that any award approved by the
court must be pro-rated to the extent it exceeds $50.000.00. 585 F.2d at 53. The"fund"charac-
terization has little analytical value, because in this case "attorneys' fees fund" is separate from
the plaintiffs' "damages fund." Id.
205. 585 F.2d at 49, 53. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976); text accompanying notes 75-81
supra.
206. 585 F.2d at 53-54.
207. Id. at 53.
208. Id. Compare text accompanying notes 20-26, 30 & 36-47 supra (regarding a court's
equitable power to award fees) with text accompanying notes 48-110 supra (regarding a court's
statutory power to award fees).
209. 585 F.2d at 53. The court stated that since statutorily authorized fees are not paid out of
plaintiffs' recovery, and the attorneys in seeking their fee are not acting adversely to the plain-
tiffs' interest, the time expended by them in obtaining a reasonable fee is justifiably included in
the court's fee award. Id.
210. Id.
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Circuit expressed concern that attorneys would be hesitant to accept Title
VII cases, civil rights cases, or other cases for which attorneys' fees are
statutorily authorized. 2 11 Such a result, the Prandini II court maintained,
"would not comport with the purpose behind most statutory fee authoriza-
tions, viz, the encouragement of attorneys to represent indigent clients and
to act as private attorpeys general in vindicating congressional policies." 212
The court also cited other cases in which statutory fee awards had included
compensation for the time spent on the fee application and successful fee
appeals. 213
In dissent, Judge Weis argued that attempts to simplify often lead to
increased complexity, and that the Third Circuit's efforts to make the deter-
mination of a reasonable fee more precise have led only to confusion. 214 He
maintained that Prandini II does comport with the Lindy II rule, and that
there should be no award to attorneys for the services performed in securing
their own fees. 2 15
IV. THE STATE OF THE LAW AFTER Hughes AND Prandini II
The Third Circuit's introduction of some measure of consistency into
fee calculations by the analytical framework established in the Lindy line of
cases 216 is admirable in lieu of the lack of uniformity that continues to per-
vade other circuit court decisions. 217 It would clearly be unfair, especially
in civil rights cases, to subject litigants and attorneys who are similarly
situated to widely differing treatment. 218
A close scrutiny of Hughes and Prandini II however, reveals a scheme
for analyzing fee awards which could result in more confusion in an already
complicated area. 219 As Judge Weis argued in his dissenting opinion in
Prandini JJ,220 the Third Circuit's efforts to make the determination of
reasonable fees more precise by refining and qualifying the standards set out
in Lindy I and Lindy II 221 will lead to increased confusion and complex-
211. id.
212. Id. (citations omitted).
213. Id. at 53-54, citing Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609 (1st Cir. 1977); Panior v. Iber-
ville Parish School Bd., 543 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1976); Hairston v. R & R Apartments, 510 F.2d
1090 (7th Cir. 1975); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972); Parker v. Matthews, 411
F. Supp. 1059 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Torres v. Sachs, 69 F.R.D.
343 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D.
680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547
(1978) (Supreme Court specifically declined to consider the propriety of a fee award).
214. 585 F.2d at 54 (Weis, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 55 (Weis, J., dissenting).
216. See notes 125-215 and accompanying text supra.
217. See Berger, supra note 2, at 292.
218. Id.
219. See text accompanying note 214 supra. See generally Berger, supra note 2.
220. 585 F.2d at 54 (Weis, J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 214 & 215 supra.
Judge Weis stated: "The case law on counsel fees offers some proof of validity to the adage
that attempts to simplify often lead to increased complexity and efforts to clarify frequently
cause only confusion." 585 F.2d at 54 (Weis, J., dissenting).
221. See notes 151-213 and accompanying text supra.
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ity.2 22 The guidelines established in Lindy I and Lindy II were intended to
be used by district courts as "route markers in groping for that elusive con-
cept 'reasonable compensation."' 223 Although the ultimate result is a
"specific figure wearing an air of precision, we must not forget that it is,
after all, a product of compromise, estimates, and inevitably, subjective
evaluation." 224
Furthermore, under the equitable common fund cases, the basis of the
fee determination is an unjust enrichment rationale, 225 which takes into ac-
count the time expended by the attorney. 226 Although policy considerations
lead to the same conclusion in statutory cases, 227 many of the statutes that
provide for fee awards do not permit monetary recoveries. 228 Some com-
mentators thus maintain that it is virtually impossible in such cases to trans-
late the result of the lawsuit into quantitative terms. 229 In the continued
absence of Supreme Court guidance, 23 0 it can only be hoped that the Third
Circuit's attempts to simplify the determination of a reasonable fee will not
further confuse the district courts and will be followed by other circuits in a
trend toward uniformity. 23'
Although the Lindy line of cases involved antitrust violations, 232 it is
clear from Hughes and Prandini I that Lindy established the analytical
framework for an award of attorneys' fees to be utilized in civil rights cases.
In distinguishing Hughes and Prandini II from Lindy on the basis that the
former cases involve an award of fees pursuant to statute while the latter
involves an award under the equitable common fund doctrine, however, the
Third Circuit has established a point of departure from the Lindy framework
when evaluating statutory civil rights cases. 2 33 The district courts must
therefore be cautious in adjusting the Lindy framework to comport with the
Third Circuit's recent pronouncements in Hughes and Prandini 11.
In statutory cases, such as Hughes and Prandini II, the district court,
once having determined the Lindy amount, 23 4 is now required to consider
an adjustment to that amount so as to further the "important substantive
purposes" of the statute which authorizes the fee award. 23 5 For example,
222. 585 F.2d at 54 (Weis, J., dissenting).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See notes 36-47 and accompanying text supra.
226. See notes 128-32 and accompanying text supra.
227. Berger, supra note 2, at 316.
228. See text accompanying notes 74, 81 & 84 supra.
229. Berger, supra note 2, at 316.
230. See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
231. At least two other circuits have followed the Third Circuit's lead in Lindy I and Lindy II
in an effort to curb excessive attorneys' fees in class action litigation. See City of Detroit v.
Grinnell Corp., 575 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 11977); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513
F.2d 114 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975).
232. See notes 125 & 126 and accompanying text supra.
233. See notes 196-213 and accompanying text supra.
234. See notes 128-34 & 137-50 and accompanying text supra.
235. 578 F.2d at 492 & n.5 (Garth, J., concurring).
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the award in Hughes was made pursuant to the Awards Act. 23 6  The district
court should therefore take into account the "private attorney general" policy
behind the Awards Act and should further consider
the importance of the constitutional right and congressional policy
which has been vindicated; the number of citizens who have been
benefited or whose rights have been vindicated (either as class
members or through stare decisis); the extent of the constitutional
violation which has been remedied (i.e., how widespread or perva-
sive was the civil rights violation); whether the attorney has suc-
cessfully advanced a novel theory or interpretation; [and] the ex-
tent to which the public interest has been served. 237
In sum, Hughes and Prandini II require district courts to make an adjust-
ment to the Lindy amount in nonfund statutory civil rights cases which ac-
counts for all of the factors relevant to reasonableness and the substantive
purposes of the statute under which the fee is awarded. 238  Furthermore,
these factors must be articulated and supported by the record.2 39
It is further submitted that the court's holding in Prandini II that in
statutory fee cases, as distinguished from equitable common fund cases, attorneys
are entitled to compensation for the time spent on the fee application
and on successful fee appeals, is justifiable.2 40  In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Third Circuit properly considered the possibility of attorneys be-
coming apprehensive of litigating civil rights cases. 24 1 Since statutory attor-
neys' fees provisions are intended to achieve the fullest possible enforcement
of the underlying policies of those statutes,2 4 2 reasonable attorneys' fees
thereunder are those which will serve that purpose best. 24 3
Recent surveys have indicated and commentators have maintained,
however, that statutory fee awards under civil rights statutes have been sub-
stantially lower than awards under antitrust, securities, and other fee statutes. 244
This is justified by some courts2 45 and commentators 246 as a "pub-
lic interest discount" on the grounds that attorneys have a professional re-
236. Id. at 485. See note 159 and accompanying text supra.
237. 578 F.2d at 492 n.5. (Garth, J., concurring), citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
390 U.S. 400 (1968).
238. 578 F.2d at 492 (Garth, J., concurring).
239. Id. at 493 (Garth J., concurring); 585 F.2d at 52.
240. 585 F.2d at 52-54. See text accompanying notes 196-213 supra.
241. 585 F.2d at 53. See text accompanying notes 211 & 212 supra.
242. See text accompanying notes 54-73, 76-80, 83 & 85-93 supra.
243. See notes 74, 81, 84, 112-13 and accompanying test supra; Berger, supra note 2, at
310.
244. Berger, supra note 2, at 310-11.
245. See, e.g., Souza v. Travismo, 512 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (1st Cir.), vacated and remanded,
423 U.S. 809 (1975); National Resources Defense Council Inc. v. EPA, 0484 F.2d 1331, 1338-39
(1st Cir. 1973).
246. Berger, supra note 2, at 311.
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sponsibility to represent clients who are unable to pay247 and to bring suits
that are in the public interest. 248 The practical effect, however, of awarding
fees in antitrust cases that are four to five times higher than those awarded
in Title VII or Title II cases is to make antitrust cases financially more attrac-
tive to the legal profession. 249 It is submitted, therefore, that since the
incentive to participate in public interest litigation is already diminished by
the prospect of a smaller fee award, the Third Circuit is justified in not
further discouraging attorneys from representing indigent clients and from
acting as private attorney generals by allowing them the costs incurred on
their fee applications and appeals.
V. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that with a better understanding of the Third Circuit's
statutory and decisional guidelines respecting attorneys' fee awards in civil
rights cases, the Bar will be able to more successfully represent clients in
such complex litigation. In light of Hughes and Prandini II, however, the
district courts' task of determining reasonable attorneys' fees has become
more complex. Attorneys confronted with an award question should there-
fore attempt to assist the district courts in comporting with the Supreme
Court's and Third Circuit's recent pronouncements of law regarding attorney
fee awards.
Vanessa Dienna Anthony
247. See notes 245 & 246 supra; Gilpen v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F.
Supp. 1233, 1253 (D. Kan. 1974) (attorneys should not be motivated by a desire for profit but
by public spirit and sense of duty).
248. See, e.g., Gilpen v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1253
(D. Kan. 1974).
249. Berger, supra note 2, at 311.
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ATTORNEYS' FEES- SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY - SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
BARS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN
ACTION UNDER TITLE VI.
Shannon v. HUD (1978)
Plaintiffs prevailed in a suit against the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)' when the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that HUD had violated several federal
statutes,' including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI). 3 On
remand, the district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, 4 who thereaf-
ter petitioned the district court5 under the then newly enacted Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Attorney's Fees Act or Act) 6 for an
award of attorney's fees. 7 The district court denied plaintiffs' petition 8 and
the Third Circuit affirmed, 9 holding that an award of attorney's fees against a
department of the federal government for a violation of Title VI was barred
1. Shannon v. HUD, 577 F.2d 854, 855 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 611
(1978).
2. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970). The plaintiffs, who were local
businessmen, property owners, and residents, had brought a class action against HUD and
additional defendants, the Secretary of the Department and two regional administrators, chal-
lenging HUD's approval of a deviation from an urban renewal plan without hearings. Shannon
v. HUD, 305 F.Supp. 205, 207, 212 (E.D. Pa. 1969), vacated, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970). The
district court dismissed the complaint. 305 F. Supp. at 225. The Third Circuit vacated the
district court's order, holding that defendants' failure to consider the possible impact of changes
in an urban renewal plan on the racial composition of an area violated the Housing Act of 1949,
42 U.S.C. § 1450 (1976), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), and
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976). 436 F.2d at 821-22.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Title VI prohibits discrimination in federally funded projects
based on race, color, or national origin. Id. The Supreme Court has held that Title VI applies to
federally funded housing projects. Hill v. Gatreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 301 (1976).
4. 577 F.2d at 855. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs in May, 1975. Id.
5. Shannon v. HUD, 433 F.Supp. 249, 251 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 854 (3d
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 611 (1978). Plaintiffs has previously peti-
tioned the district court under a fee shifting provision in Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3610
(1976), but the court held the provision inapplicable to the violation found by the court of
appeals, and denied plaintiffs' petition. Shannon v. HUD, 409 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Although no appeal was taken, plaintiffs did except to the clerk's taxation of costs and petitioned
the court to reconsider the attorney's fees question under Title VI. 433 F. Supp. at 251.
6. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)). For the text of this Act, see note 47 infra.
7. 433 F. Supp. at 251. The court cited the recent promulgation of the Act, which allowed
fee shifting under Title VI, as a " 'reason justifying relief from the operation' of the previous
order denying attorney's fees." Id., citing FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). See note 5 supra.
8. 433 F. Supp. at 252.
9. The case was heard by Judges Hunter and Weis and by Judge Layton of the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware, sitting by designation. The court issued a per
curiam opinion.
(242)
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by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Shannon v. HUD, 577 F.2d 854 (3d
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 611 (1978).l0
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which immunizes the government
from suit absent the consent of the legislature," was well established in
England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. 1 2  American critics
10. Accord, Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 436 F. Supp. 891 (D. Or. 1977).
11. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687-89 (1949). The
operation of the doctrine cannot be abrogated simply by naming as party defendant a govern-
ment official rather than the government itself. Id. at 689-96. If the official were acting within
his valid authority, the suit fails as one against the government. Id. at 691 n.ll. If the govern-
ment official acted outside of his authority or on invalid authority but "the relief requested can
not be granted by merely ordering the cessation of the conduct complained of but will require
affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property," the
suit fails as one against the government. Id. (citations omitted). This rule, originally stated as a
supposition, has been elevated by reflexive citation to a mandatory conclusion. Note, Adminis-
trative Law-Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar Suit Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act For
Renewal of Federal Funding, 52 TEx. L. REV. 1210, 1212 (1974).
12. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments And Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REv.
1, 2 (1963). Historically, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been said to be derived from
the concept that "the King can do no wrong." Id. at 4. Professor Jaffe believes that this maxim
was simply intended to mean that the King shall do no wrong, and was actually unrelated to the
development of the doctrine. Id. Instead, he finds the doctrine's origin in the peculiarities of
English procedural law. Id. at 3-4. He maintains that the sovereign was immune without his
consent, not because he was above the law, but rather because he was perceived as its source.
Id. at 3. Since the King was the source of the law, all writs issued from him. Id. For this
reason, P~pfessor Jaffe contends, an individual with a cause of action against the Crown could
not secure a writ necessary to institute an action, as it would be a logical anomaly for the King
to issue or enforce a writ against himself. Id. at 3-4. To remedy this situation a procedure in
lieu of a writ was developed whereby a citizen could petition the King requesting his consent to
be sued. Id. at 3. The doctrine thus developed that the Crown could not be sued eo nomine
without its consent. Id. at 2.
By comparison, Justice Holmes placed the doctrine's origin on broader, philosophical
grounds when he said: "A sovereign is exempt from suit ... on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
The doctrine was accepted by American courts despite the theoretical problem of assimilat-
ing a concept based upon a figurehead that did not exist in the United States. See Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793). Chisholm is representative of the theoretical debate which
preceded the doctrine's acceptance. Despite a strong dissent from Justice Iredell, id. at 429
(Iredell, J., dissenting), the Court held that an individual state was not immune from suit. Id. at
480. The decision led directly to the enactment of the eleventh amendment, according to one
commentator. Note, supra note 11, at 1211. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. In a case decided after the
adoption of the eleventh amendment had settled the doctrine's applicability to the states, Chief
Justice Marshall assumed that the doctrine barred suits against the United States as well.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 262, 411 (1821).
In England, petitions of right, the procedure used for obtaining consent, were liberally
granted and were only required to sue the Crown by name. Jaffe, supra at 2. When the doc-
trine was adapted to fit the American political system, however, the liberal English procedures
for circumventing the sovereign's immunity were lost. Note, supra note 11, at 1211 n.5. In
situations where a simple petition of right would have permitted suit against the Crown, the
American courts found that, by analogy, consent of the legislature was required. Hill v. United
States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 385, 389 (1850) (comparing a petition of right to legislative action). See,
e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); United States v. Chemical Foundation,
272 U.S. 1, 20 (1926); Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1186, 1189
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of the doctrine protested the anomaly of a government of the people which
was not answerable to the people in the courts. 13 In response to growing
disapproval of the doctrine, 14 Congress began to increase the accountability
of the federal government as early as 1855.15
Any doubts regarding the doctrine's continued viability, however, were
resolved in its favor by the Supreme Court's decision in Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Commerce Corp. 16 Seen by some as a reaffirmation of the doc-
trine, 17 Larson indicated that, notwithstanding the trend of congressional
enactments, the federal courts would hesitate to advance the cause of gov-
ernmental legal responsibility beyond the parameters of specific legislation.' 8
(D.C. Cir. 1977); United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 361 (3d Cir. 1975)
(Congress must provide a statutory waiver). See also Jaffe, supra, at 2.
13. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 456 (1793) (Wilson, J., concurring). In
Chisholm, Justice Wilson stated that "the term sovereign has for its correlative, subject, [sic] In
this sense, the term can receive no application; for it has no object in the Constitution of the
United States. Under that Constitution there are citizens, but no subjects." Id. (emphasis
supplied by the Court). Over 150 years later Justice Frankfurter made this cryptic observation:
"As to the States, legal irresponsibility was written into the Constitution by the Eleventh
Amendment; as to the United States, it is derived by implication." Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 708 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added). See also id. at 723 & n.13 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Jaffe, supra note
12, at 1-3; Note, supra note 11, at 1211.
14. Note, supra note 11, at 1211. Justice Frankfurter stated that "[iun varying degrees, at
different times, the momentum of the historic doctrine is arrested or deflected biy an unex-
pressed feeling that governmental immunity runs counter to prevailing notions of reason and
justice." Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 709 (1949) (Frankfur-
ter, J., dissenting).
15. See generally Court of Claims Act, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855) (amended version at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1491-1506 (1976)); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). Mr. Justice
Frankfurter has noted:
In the course of a century or more a steadily expanding conception of public morality
regarding "government responsibility" has led to a "generous policy of consent for suits
against the government to compensate for the negligence of its agents as well as to secure
obedience to its contracts."
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 709 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting), quoting Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 396 (1939).
16. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
17. Jaffe, supra note 12, at 29.
18. 337 U.S. at 703-04. The Larson majority refused to take judicial action to limit the scope
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to the federal government. ld. The Court
noted:
It is argued that the principle of sovereign immunity is an archaic hangover not
consonant with modern morality and it should therefore be limited wherever possible.
There may be substance in such a viewpoint as applied to suits for damages. The Con-
gress has increasingly permitted such suits to be maintained against the sovereign and we
should give hospitable scope to that trend. But the reasoning is not applicable to suits for
specific relief.
Id. (footnote omitted). Likewise, the Court has held in the past that the doctrine rests on sound
principles of public policy: "The principle is fundamental, applies to every sovereign power, and
but for the protection it affords, the government would be unable to perform the various duties
for which it was created." Nicholl v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 125, 127 (1868). "[A]n
attempt to overrule or to impair [the government's immunity] on a foundation independently
[sic] of such permission must involve an inconsistency and confusion, both in theory and prac-
tice, subversive of regulated order or power." Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 385, 389
(1850).
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An exemption from court costs and attorney's fees is corollary to the
government's immunity from suit. 19 This separate immunity, arising in
cases where the government has consented to be sued on the underlying
liability, dictates that such consent does not subject the government to costs
and attorney's fees. 20  Such long established immunity 2' was expressly as-
serted by section 2412 of the Judicial Code,2 2 which codified the common
law rule that the sovereign was immune to these items absent an express
waiver.23  In 1966, however, Congress amended that provision, 24 reversing
the presumption of immunty to costs. 25  In amending section 2412 to re-
quire an express assertion rather than an express waiver of immunity, the
Senate recognized the inconsistency inherent in permitting the United
States to escape liability for court costs when its immunity to suit on the
underlying liability had been waived. 26  Despite this reversal of the pre-
sumption as to costs, however, section 2412 as amended maintains the fed-
eral government's immunity from an award of attorney's fees. 27
Accordingly, a waiver of sovereign immunity will be strictly construed. See United States v.
Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976). In Testan the Court held that "a waiver of the traditional sovereign
immunity 'cannot be implied but must be unequivocably expressed.' " Id. at 399, quoting United
States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). In an earlier case the Court noted: "Statutes which waive
immunity of the United States from suit are to be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign."
McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951) (footnote omitted). Still earlier the Court
approached this problem by "[clonstruing the statutory language with that conservatism which is
appropriate in the case of a waiver of sovereign immunity." United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584, 590 (1941).
19. See United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 20 (1926). The Chemical Foun-
dation Court stated: "The general rule is that in the absence of a statute directly authorizing it,
courts will not give judgments against the United States for costs or expenses .... Congress
alone has the power to waive or qualify that immunity." Id.
20. As the D.C. Circuit recently noted, "a general waiver of sovereign immunity should not
be construed to extend to attorney's fees unless Congress has clearly indicated that it should."
Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1186, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1977), citing
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976); Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240 (1975).
21. See note 19 supra.
22. Law of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 973 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1964))
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976)). The original version provided: "The United States
shall be liable for fees and costs only when such liability is expressly provided by Act of Con-
gress." id.
23. Id. "[Subsection (a)] follows the well-known common law rule that a sovereign is not
liable for costs unless specific provision for such liability is made by law. This is a corollary to
the rule that a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent." Reviser's Note, id. See also notes
19 & 20 supra.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976) (as amended 1966).
25. See id.
26. S. REP. No. 1329, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2527, 2528. The report states:
The present law permits a disparity of treatment between private litigants and the
United States concerning the allowance of court costs .... It is fundamental that the law
should be uniform in its application. This bill will provide for uniformity of treatment in
the award of costs. Apparently the present inequality is related to a governmental advan-
tage derived from the principle favoring immunity of the sovereign from suit. Under
modern conditions, there is no reason for this advantage when the law provides for suit
against the Government.
Id.
27. See notes 24 & 26 and accompanying text supra.
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While the traditional "American Rule" as to attorney's fees is that each
party pays its respective fees regardless of the outcome of the litigation, 2
there are both statutory and judicial exceptions to this rule. Many federal
statutes include provisions which require or permit the courts to shift the
fees of a prevailing private party to a private opponent. 29 In some provi-
sions the legislature has exercised its prerogative and included a waiver of
the government's immunity to fee awards.
30
The judiciary has created exceptions to the American rule as well, but
these are barred by sovereign immunity, which only the legislature can
waive, wherever applicable. 3 ' Pursuant to their equity powers, the courts
have shifted fees: 1) where one party acted in bad faith in bringing the suit
or in the conduct of litigation; 32 or 2) where a fee shift would accomplish
the distribution of cost among the class which the litigation benefitted.
33
28. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 (1972); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,
717 (1967). For an excellent discussion of the no-fee rule, see Comment, The Discretionary
Award of Attorney's Fees By The Federal Courts: Selective Deviation From The No-Fee Rule
And The Regrettably Brief Life of the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 588
(1975). See also Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL L.
REV. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not A Cost of Litigation?, 42 IOWA L. REV.
75 (1963); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L.
REV. 202 (1966).
29. There are over 50 of these provisions in federal legislation. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 13-14 (1976). Each fee shifting provision falls into one of four categories:
1) mandatory awards to prevailing plaintiffs; 2) mandatory awards to the prevailing party;
3) discretionary awards to prevailing plaintiffs; and 4) discretionary awards to the prevailing
party. Id. at 5. The fee shifting provisions in civil rights statutes generally fall into the fourth
category. Id.
30. For example, the fee shifting provision of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b)(1976), includes this sentence: "The court, in its discretion, may allow . . . a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the
same as a private person." Id. Title III of the same act provides: "In any action or proceeding
under this subchapter the United States shall be liable for costs, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee, the same as a private person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-1 (1976). See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k) (1976).
31. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
32. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2574 (1978); Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S.
527 (1962); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575 (1946); Toledo Scale Co. v.
Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923); Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir.
1966); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963); Federal Facilities Realty Trust v. Kulp,
227 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1955); Schlien v. Smith, 160 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1947); In re Swartz, 130
F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1942).
33. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, Inc., 396 U.S. 375
(1970); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719 (1967); United
States v. Equitable Trust Co., 283 U.S. 738 (1931); Harrison v. Perea, 168 U.S. 311 (1897);
Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S.
527 (1881); Gibbs v. Blackwelder, 346 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1965); Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d
185 (1st Cir. 1959); Walsh v. National iSav. & Trust Co., 247 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Cannon
v. Parker, 152 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 806 (1946); Crumb v. Ramish,
86 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1936). See generally Comment, supra note 28, at 601; Comment, The
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 205, 207-11 (1977);
Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees To The "Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light To
Private Litigation In The Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 734-42 (1973).
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A third judicial exception to the American rule, the private attorney
general theory, also gained short-lived recognition. 3 4  This theory, tailored
especially to public interest litigation, 35 was approved by the Supreme Court
in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises.36  In Newman, plaintiffs had pre-
vailed in a suit under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 37 but their
petition for fees under the Title II provision which grants the courts' discre-
tion to shift fees 38 was denied.39 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that under a discretionary fee shifting provision, prevailing plaintiffs should
ordinarily receive their reasonable attorney's fees where they vindicated im-
portant rights of all citizens which "Congress considered of the highest prior-
ity." 40  Although Newman involved the application of a fee shifting statute,
the lower courts began to utilize the private attorney general rationale to
shift fees in the absence of an applicable fee shifting provision as long as the
plaintiffs had acted in accordance with a congressional policy of private en-
forcement and had succeeded in vindicating important rights.
41
34. This exception came into use after the Supreme Court's decision in Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968). Its employment, without statutory authority, was fore-
closed by the Court's opinion in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
A private attorney general has been defined as a citizen who, in bringing suit, furthers "a
congressional policy envisioning private enforcement of a federal law" and succeeds in vindicat-
ing important rights of all citizens. Comment, supra note 33, at 205. See also Comment,
Alyeska Pipeline Turns Off the Tap: Can Public Interest Law Survive?, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 239
(1976).
35. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). Public interest law
by definition involves questions affecting the rights of all citizens. See id. at 401-02. A judgment
for monetary relief out of which to pay attorney's fees, however, is rarely available. Id. at 402.
The Court noted that very often in suits of this kind only injunctive relief is available. Id. See
note 40 infra.
36. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to a-6 (1976).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976). See note 30 supra.
39. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 377 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 390 U.S.
400 (1968).
40. 390 U.S. at 402 (footnote omitted). In particular, the Court noted:
When a plaintiff brings an action under [Title II] he cannot recover damages. If he
obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a "private attorney
general," vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. If success-
ful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties
would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of
the federal courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees ....
Id. (footnote omitted).
41. See, e.g., Souza v. Travisoni, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d
899 (6th Cir. 1974); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974); Cornest v. Rich-
land Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th
Cir. 1974); Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d
885 (9th Cir. 1974); Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973); Donahue v. Staunton, 471
F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th
Cir. 1972); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp.,
444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972). But see
Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 327-31 (1972), vacated on other grounds, 416 U.S. 696
(1974).
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Despite plaudits by critics of the American rule, 42 the utilization of the
private attorney general theory was short-lived. 43 In Alyeska Pipeline Serv-
ice Co. v. Wilderness Society, 44 the Supreme Court reversed the award of
attorney's fees to a private plaintiff against a private defendant, holding that
the private attorney general theory has no application in the absence of a
statutory provision granting the court the discretion to shift fees. 4 5  In re-
sponse, Congress promulgated the Attorney's Fees Act "to remedy anoma-
lous gaps in our civil rights laws created by the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, . . . and to
achieve consistency in our civil rights laws." 46  The Attorney's Fees Act
grants to the courts the discretion to shift fees in cases brought under civil
rights statutes which do not incorporate fee shifting provisions. 47
Against this background of developing law, the Third Circuit in Shan-
non addressed the issue of the propriety of an award of attorney's fees
against the United States in an action under Title VI. 4" Beginning its
analysis with section 2412, 4 9 the court noted that a specific fee shifting pro-
vision must surmount the mandate of this section to be effective against the
United States. 50  It indicated that the specific provision applicable to the
instant case was the Attorney's Fees Act. 51 Comparing the language used in
42. The commentators point out that the American rule places a prohibitive price tag on the
enforcement of rights. See notes 33 & 34 supra. See also Tunney, Financing The Cost of En-
forcing Legal Rights, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 632 (1974). Tunney urged the courts not to interpret
congressional silence on fee shifting to mean that they could not act independently to shift fees.
Id. at 633-34.
43. For a discussion of duration of the doctrine's efficacy, see note 34 supra.
44. 421 U.S. 240 (1974).
45. Id. at 269-71. The Court's holding has been described by one commentator as indicating
that since "Congress alone was responsible for determining when private prosecution of specific
statutes furthered public policy .... fees would not be awarded under the private attorney
general theory to a prevailing plaintiff without Congressional authority." Comment, supra note
33, at 206.
46. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5908, 5909.
47. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)). The Attorney's
Fees Act provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, and
1981 of the Revised Statutes [42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986], title IX of
Public Law 92-318, or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United
States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States
Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs.
id.
48. 577 F.2d at 855-56.
49. Id. at 855. See text accompanying note 24 supra. The Third Circuit's opinion inaccu-
rately quotes section 2412 as asserting sovereign immunity to costs and fees. 577 F.2d at 855
n.1. This overlooks the 1966 amendment to section 2412. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976). See notes 21
& 25 and accompanying text supra. However, since both before and after the 1966 amendment
section 2412 asserted the government's immunity to attorney's fees, the error does not affect the
court's reasoning. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976).
50. 577 F.2d at 855.
51. Id. at 856. Plaintiffs relied on the legislative history of the Act, Brief for Appellants at
7-9, which states that the Act's purpose is to fill "'anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws." S.
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other federal statutes to waive immunity to fees with the provisions of the
Attorney's Fees Act, 52 the court found that while both the Act and the noted
federal statutes provide for assessment of reasonable attorney's fees as costs,
the Attorney's Fees Act omits the clear waiver of sovereign immunity found
in the other provisions. 53 The court thus held that "the Act does not explic-
ity waive the sovereign immunity of the United States." 5 4
The court also rejected the plaintiff's position that the legislative history
would support the finding of an implicit waiver. 55  Upon consideration of
the relevant legislative history, the court noted that "Congress did not con-
template a waiver of sovereign immunity in passing the Act, with the excep-
tion of the clause dealing with Internal Revenue suits." 56
The court's opinion thus accurately reflects the legislative history of the
Attorney's Fees Act, 57 which indicates that the Act was directed at resurrect-
ing the private attorney general exception, not at abrogating sovereign im-
munity. 58  In reporting on the Attorney's Fees Act, the House of Represen-
tatives Committee on the Judiciary noted that the need for this legislation
REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5908, 5909.
Plaintiffs argued that the provision was remedial and should be liberally construed. Brief
for Appellants at 7-8, 15-18. Further, they contended that since the bill's purpose was to pro-
vide the enumerated statutes with a fee shifting provision comparable with those found in other
civil rights titles, and since those other titles waive immunity, the court must find that the Act
implicitly waived immunity. id. at 8-18.
52. 577 F.2d at 856. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
53. 577 F.2d at 856.
54. Id. The court adopted the canon of construction applied by the district court that a
waiver of immunity must be explicit and will be.strictly construed. Id. at 855. See 433 F. Supp.
at 251.
55. 577 F.2d at 856.
56. Id. The provision relating to Internal Revenue Service suits, known as the Allen
Amendment, was added after the bill was reported out of committee. 122 CONG. REC.
S17,049-51 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976). The court stated:
Congressman Drinan, a House sponsor of the bill, noted that the Allen Amendment was
the only provision in the bill which would involve expenditures by the .United States.
The legislative history also clarifies an ambiguity in the statute caused by the Allen
Amendment. The phrase "by or on behalf of the United States of America" was meant to
modify only the phrase "to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United
States Internal Revenue Code," and not the phrase "or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964."
577 F.2d at 56 n.2 (citations omitted). Accord, Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 436
F. Supp. 891, 893 (D. Or. 1977). In Southeast Legal Defense Group, plaintiffs prevailed against
federal and state defendants in a suit based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), challenging the
location of a proposed freeway. 436 F. Supp. at 892. Plaintiffs moved for an award of attorney's
fees under the Attorney's Fees Act. Id. In determining the propriety of an award of attorney's
fees against the federal defendants, the court, like the Third Circuit in Shannon, began with
section 2412, examined the express waivers in other statutes, looked to tle legislative history of
the Attorney's Fees Act, and decided that the Act did not waive the immunity of the federal
government to fees. Id. at 893. The court found that it could award fees against the state
defendants. Id. at 893-95. Accord, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
57. For a discussion of the approach taken by courts in determining whether a statute
waives immunity, see note 18 and accompanying text supra.
58. See notes 59-76 and accompanying text infra.
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was created by the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska, 59 while the report
of the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the bill's purpose was "to
remedy anomalous gaps .. .created by the United States Supreme Court's
recent decision in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society."60 The
Alyeska decision had held that attorney's fees could not be awarded against a
private defendant under the private attorney general rationale absent specific
elements, 6 thus precluding the courts from shifting fees under the statutes
enumerated in the Attorney's Fees Act while still permitting fee shifting in
other civil rights cases. Responding to this anomaly, congressional concern
was focused on the court's denunciation of the private attorney general ex-
pection,6 2 a theory which even prior to Alyeska could not overcome
sovereign immunity.
6 3
Moreover, the immunity of the federal government to attorney's fees is
not discussed in the committee report of either house. 64  Both reports,
59. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1976). For a discussion of Alyeska, see
notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text supra.
60. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5908, 5909.
61. 421 U.S. at 269-71. The Court concluded that fee shifting was not permissible absent
statutory authorization or the applicability of either the traditional bad faith or common benefit
exceptions. Id. at 241. For a discussion of these exceptions to the American rule, see notes
29-33 and accompanying text supra. The doctrine of sovereign immunity did not go without
mention in the Court's opinion. 421 U.S. at 287 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Secretary of the
Interior was also a defendant in the suit, and the lower appellate court had held that as to him
an award under the private attorney general theory was barred by sovereign immunity. Id. The
Court agreed, noting that -§ 2412 on its face, and in light of its legislative history, generally
bars such awards, which, if allowable at all, must be expressly provided for by statute, as, for
example, under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id. at 267-68 (footnotes omitted)
(citations omitted).
62. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1976); S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5909. The Senate noted:
"This bill creates no startling new remedy-it only meets the technical requirements that the
Supreme Court has laid down if the Federal courts are to continue the practice of awarding
attorneys' fees which had been going on for years prior to the Court's May decision." Id. at 6,
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5913.
63. See notes 19, 20 & 31 and accompanying text supra. The majority in Alyeska recognized
the continued immunity of the federal government to fees under a judicially created exception,
stating "nor should the federal courts purport to adopt on their own initiative a rule awarding
attorneys' fees based on the private-attorney-general approach when such judicial rule will oper-
ate only against private parties and not against the Government." 421 U.S. at 269 (footnote
omitted).
64. The only reference in the House report to the federal government as a party appears in
a discussion of the propriety of an award in favor of a prevailing defendant. H.R. REP. No.
1558, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (1976). The Committee indicated that they did not feel that an
award to a prevailing federal government defendant would be proper. Id. The Senate report
discussed the possibility of an award against a state or a state official, which the Committee
determined would be justified under the fourteenth amendment, but did not address the im-
munity of federal government defendants. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5, re-
printed in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5913. Both reports compare the Attor-
ney's Fees Act to fee shifting provisions which do in fact include a waiver of immunity, but the
comparison is made only to indicate that civil rights fees provisions are ordinarily framed as
discretionary rather than mandatory, and for that reason the Act places fee shifting within the
discretion of the court. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5-8 (1976); see also 122
CONG. REP. H12,152 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinan).
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however, incorporate the report of the Congressional Budget Office, which
indicated "that no additional cost to the government would be incurred as a
result of enactment of this bill." 65 The debates in both houses of Congress
are replete with statements by the bill's supporters that, with the exception
of the Allen Amendment, 66 the bill would not result in any expense to the
federal government. 67  Interpreting the Attorney's Fees Act to waive im-
munity would be inconsistent with these statements since the loss of that
immunity would, in the proper case, result in federal liability for another's
attorney's fees, thereby creating a new and additional expense for the gov-
ernment.
Furthermore, abrogation of sovereign immunity was specifically rejected
in the Senate debates. 68 During those debates Senator Helms proposed an
amendment broadly waiving the federal government's immunity. 6 9 The
Helms Amendment would have amended section 2412 to allow the recovery
of attorney's fees against the United States by civil litigants and criminal
defendants.7 0  After a brief discussion which focused on the fact that the
present bill would involve little or no expense to the federal government
while the Helms Amendment would institute fundamental changes at an in-
determinate price,7 ' the motion was tabled.7 2
The Attorney's Fees Act clearly accomplished Congress' express purpose
of restoring the private attorney general theory to its pre-Alyeska status quo
with respect to civil rights litigation.7 3  When the Supreme Court noted in
Alyeska that the courts cannot shift fees without express authority,7 4 Con-
gress acted swiftly to fill that "anomalous gap." 75 The Act, however, does
not remedy the inability of the private attorney general theory to surmount
65. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5908, 5914; H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 10 (1976).
66. 122 CONG. REC. S17,049-51 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976). For a discussion of the scope and
application to date of the Allen Amendment, see Novig, Attorney's Fee Awards in Tax Litiga-
tion, 64 A.B.A.J. 1601 (1978).
67. Congressman Drinan, a House sponsor of the bill and member of the House Commit-
tee, noted during the debate that the addition of the Allen Amendment would involve negligi-
ble costs to the United States, 122 CONG. KEC. H12,159 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of
Rep. Drinan). See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. H12,154 & H12,159-60 (daily ed. Oct 1, 1976) (re-
marks of Rep. Drinan); Id. at S16,259-60 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Mathias
comparing the Allen and Helms Amendments); Id. at H12,162-63 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (re-
marks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
68. See 122 CONG. REC. S16,260 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Mathias).
69. Id. at S16,257-58 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
70. Id.
71. Id. at S16,259 (remarks of Sen. Helms and Sen. Mathias).
72. Id. at S16,261. The court in Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 436 F. Supp.
891 (D. Or. 1977), placed special emphasis on the defeat of the Helms Amendment. Id. at 893.
73. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5908, 5909; H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1976). Even in, this
respect Congress' action was conservative, since the private attorney general theory had been
applied in numerous types of cases while the Act applies only to the civil rights statutes. See
cases cited note 38 supra.
74. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
75. See notes 46 & 47 and accompanying text supra.
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the immunity of the federal government. 76  If, as the Supreme Court has
noted, "one of the main functions of a private attorney general is to call
public officials to account and to insist that they enforce the law," 77 then the
private enforcement of civil rights envisioned by Congress is still impeded.
It is submitted, that the rule which barred an award of attorney's fees to
plaintiffs in Shannon, while such fees are recoverable from the federal gov-
ernment under related statutes, is as anomalous as the gap left by
Alyeska. 7a Unless Congress responds to this situation with the appropriate
legislation, it cannot hope to effectively mobilize private attorneys general
for truly self-executing civil rights legislation. 79 Absent such legislation,
Shannon stands for the proposition that sovereign immunity continues to bar
an award of attorney's fees against the United States under the statutes
enumerated in the Attorney's Fees Act.
Claudia M. Drennen
76. This infirmity exists only where, as here, the statute does not waive immunity. See
notes 19 & 63 supra.
77. 421 U.S. at 267.
78. See notes 45-46 & 61 and accompanying text supra.
79. Congress is currently considering bills which would award attorney's fees to those who
come forward to represent the public interest in federal agency proceedings and "would permit
Federal courts to reimburse persons who bring successful lawsuits to challenge agency deci-
sions, but only where a court concludes that the action vindicates important public interests."
Public Participation In Federal Agency Proceedings Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 270 Before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) (opening statement of Sen. Kennedy). For a compari-
son with the description of a private attorney general, see notes 34 & 40 and accompanying text
supra. See S. 270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 3361, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978). The
Senate subcommittee has also generated an unnumbered original bill which is very similar to S.
270. However, none of these bills has been reported favorably out of committee.
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